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III.—THE CONSTITUTION OF THOUGHT.
BY DB. HXJBEBT FOSTON.
WHEN we see how refined and apparently remote are those
abstractions which our present science can use in the ex-
planation of the concrete activities of objects, we may be
constrained to confess that if intellection, as advancing to
general thought, was ever supposed to have surrendered pied
a terre in the sensible order of things, to explore a detached
and ethereal world of its own, the abandonment was but
seeming. We may feel that the achievements of applied
science in our own day have furnished us with such a
demonstration of a quite domestically mundane objectivity
in thought as was undreamt of in the loftily leisured philo-r
sophies of antiquity.
But if I touch on the working-day triumphs of thought,
it is not in order to claim them for a mental functioning
differentiated quite as psychology has persistently declared
general thinking to be. So long as the theory of thought
shall give chief prominence to a merely isolating abstraction,,
and a fruitlessly self-containing generalisation, we shall come
short of an adequate explanation of the control which we
obtain of what we may call the practical significances of
objects—taking an " object" merely as a presentation, and
by its " significance " meaning now no more than that of
which it is found in experience to be the signal, the anti-
cipatory "sign".1
1
 The anticipatory sign: for it may need to be somewhat carefully
observed that with the closely related, perhaps more common, scientific-
ally more complex, a potteriori meaning of the word, according to which
an effect, for instance, is interpreted to be the (retrospective) "rign"—
perhaps pott-mortm—of its cause, we have not primarily to do. Our
outlook is forwards. If a certain sound is a sign of a bell being rung,
it is so ae a portion of the evidence on the ground of which we oan con-
structively proceed forward, from an assumed movement of the bell, to
the sound again, and possibly to various probabilities of which the move-
ment might be an initial sign. It is this forward look which is the
matter of concern for our experience, and which lends motive and guid-
ance to the retrospective view.
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THE CONSTITUTION OF THOUGHT. 4 8 7
I.
SIGNIFICANCE GOVEBNS ABSTBACTION AND GENERALISATION.
An object or objective phase when interpreted as an anti-
cipatory sign of some other has, of course, a mediate function
—the ground of its interest lying outside its individually
bounded self. How deeply a mediating function is rooted
in the character of presentations generally, may be suggested
by pointing out that the main intellective function subsist-
ing with low forms of organism will presumably be determined
by natural selection to be that of taking cognisance of
objects that stand to the organism in a relation—positive or
contrary—of utility. I mean that it is according as things
should be wed, treated to some further effect, that it becomes
organically profitable and intellectually economical to notice
them. And, so far,1 the evolutional raison d'itre of presenta-
tions lies not just in what they at the moment psychically
are, but in what may biologically or psychically come to be in
consequence of their being presented. And we may say
this : that the selected forms of presentation which constitute
the objects of mental recognition in a low form of mind, will
thus owe much of their force to a mediate importance, which
a more developed intelligence, with sufficient comprehension
of facts and sequences to interpret presentations as signs,
might subjectively apprehend as their matter of augury—
their significance.
Now if, under the assumed cover of a philosophic warrant
—of the call for which I am not oblivious, while not regard-
less of the space it would require for discussion—we venture
to regard an object presented to some all-but-vegetal perci-
pient as being in some sense the same object which displays
such comparatively large psychical possibilities in my own
favoured cognition of it, we may further say that the lower
mental experience is determined to a relatively poor abstract
of the otherwise proved psychical possibilities of the object;
and that the measure of this abstract formation is determined
by the slight and simple use that can be made of the object
by the organism. In other words, a kind of a priori abstrac-
tion, arbitrarily ruling down the very percepts to those " gen-
eralised " forms of ideation which psychology now admits to
be characteristic of low forms of mind, is here conditioned
by the mediate importance of objects to the organism.
Quite similarly, I conceive, the higher abstract view of
1
 Boom has to be left for the possible affecting of tbe course of mental
evolution by the fact of individual feeling.
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488 HUBEBT FO8TON :
objects is a corollary of "their reflected mediate interest—
depending on their semiotic function. I should exhibit the
rationale of abstraction by saying that in order to avail my-
self pointedly of one object or objective phase as the undis-
tracted and distinct sign of another, I must somehow be
enabled to regard it specially in 30 far as it is such a sign.
This must be, not now under the elementary conditions of
an experience that is, as it were a priori, narrowly selective,
but in full face of the unconcealed totality of the qualities of
an object as presented to the advanced and expanded form
of mind.
Let attention be determined to some one of the perhaps
very various and conflicting associated portentive suggestions
of the presented totality—determined to it by its possibly
still further mediately conferred interest. There may thus
forthwith be brought into play that capacity for reinforcing
an image into effective competition with even perceptual
forces, which is perhaps distinctive of the human mind,
wherein, as we shall see, it subserves the function of reason.
Then—let the embarras de richesse of qualities and nascent
suggestivenesses * have been what it may—I am, so to speak,
associatively looking on one clear, determined line through
the object; and herein, looking through but not overlooking,
have achieved abstraction. A secret, for example, of the
abstract regarding of an object as " fusible " is the controll-
ing maintenance of an image of it as in a fluid state, with
some more or less definite connective consciousness of phe-
nomena which by experience are found likely to be inter-
mediate between the actual solid and fluid states/
But if, neglecting whatever individualising aspects and
claims on notice an object might otherwise have for me, I
so yield to the associated goal of interest as to make it for
my mind merely an object that can be used in some par-
ticular way to a certain effect, or an object that is a sign
of such and such an oncoming eventuality, then it and all
objects, so far forth as this one mentally selected interest
attaches to them, are appealing to me in the name of a
1
 Each of which might have its proper moment for development.
'The relatively direct and definite practical line of reference here,
approximating the instance to what may reasonably be deemed the
primitive type, lays it open to elementary treatment. Were we to go
further, and attempt to explain any well-developed abstract regarding of
an object in its " fluidity —not necessarily implied, it may be agreed,
in the largely concrete abstraction-guiding image of a fluid object as-
sumed above—we should require assistance from the principles of sections
iii. and iv. which are concerned with the arrest and suspense of the deter-
mination of significance.
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unitary mediate import1 And the aspect, of each of them,
on which is based the capacity for this appeal, is to me so
far one aspect wherever it appears.
Actual abstraction and generalisation and their prototypes
are thus alike to be understood as governed by the presence
of a controlling ulterior goal, which for the highei intellection
is set in the revealing light of consciousness as an ulterior
goal of interest—a significance, in faci.
For the lower forms of mind, the like bearing of certain
qualities of many individual objects on vital exigencies may,
through the "rough surgery" of natural selection, simply
force on and fix the generalised noticings of them while the
ulterior ground and cause of the generalisations lies itself
entirely outside mental cognizance. In the advanced mind,
the unitary suggestiveness for the sake of which certain ob-
jects are attended to is itself known. It can even be held
up for the sake of a further recognised suggestiveness—
wnile that is held up for the sake of yet another—in the
plexus of thought. And by selective attention to governing
images, an object's mode of thus contingently emphasised
suggestiveness can be controlled and changed.
If, then, we find in mind some general forms of ideation,
each having reference to an indefinite group of presentations
which resemble each other in some respect, these forms at
their lowest appear secretly to owe their constitution and
moulding in mind to a controlling—possibly biologic rather
than psychical—import beyond the mere cue of similarity:
and the distinguishing characteristic of their higher forms in
a reasoning mind is that the controlling significance is at laet
within the widened range of view, and carries on its govern-
ance by an actual mental process.
n.
SIGNIFICANCE PBOVES CONDITIONAL.
Significance, thus secondarily involving abstract views,
and therefore views at least potentially general, with refer-
ence to objectsJ stands out as the nerve of the organic con-
stitution of thought.
And yet it is not the bare faet of a presentation being so far
effective by way of sign as to give rise to some image believed
1
 From which, by the way, the objects may get one of their general
names.
* " Abstract" and " generalised " presentative views of objects consti-
tute the lower ideation: abstracted and general views upon the presenta-
tions are characteristic of the higher.
3 2
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490 HUBBBT FO8TON :
in as representative of the perceptual sequent of the pre-
sentation that can constitute it an object in what we ought
to call thought. Given that a certain phenomenon were a
regular sign of another; given that in every case of finding
the one I invariably found the other, I might indeed usefully,
and as it were automatically, generalise. But had I lived in
a world constructed throughout on such simple principles,
I do not see how I should ever have found occasion for
thought. An existing richer process requires that name.
Functioning in the way of thinking comes into play—so
I bold—on the ground that a connexion which I have
learned to look for holds sometimes, and fails sometimes : so
that a particular phenomenon is now found to have a certain
significance, and now has it not, and—this is the completion
of the present statement of the ground—I oan find a regular
distinction between the circumstances in which the phenomen-
on is a sign, and the circumstances in which it is not a sign,
of that particular significance. And whenever any creature
not merely has its attitude of self-adjustment altered accord-
ing as the usual suggester of the adjustment has or has not
a certain accompaniment in perception, but rather singles
out definitely a particular complication of some phenomenon
as the condition of its having a particular given objective sig-
nificance, then it thinks. The thinking may be very wide
of the mark: but if the mind can raise the correlative
questions, "why?" and "why no t?" and fix on some
conjunction of events or qualities as affording the (however
mistaken) answer—if, in short, it undertakes the business of
assigning conditions for seme particular significance for an object
—then, according to the view of the essentials of thought
here propounded, it thinks.1
1
 It would be impossible, so far as I see, to sift out from observations
of animals evidence that—however much they suffer their conduct to be
modified by modifications of signs—they are ever able to raise that
question of " why ? " or to assign the conditions of a particular signifi-
cance for a phenomenon. If they do so sporadically, they sorely do not
do so very consecutively. Rather than extravagantly supposing genuinely
consecutive systematic explanation to be dominant in their mental life,
we should believe that the relative dominance of consecutively explana-
tory modes of intellection went far into the accounting for the peculiar
acceleration of man's advance beyond what appears in animal com-
munities. And in view of the characteristic active persistency of that
principle of " why ? "—a quasi self-determinant persistency of which we
Lave tokens to some degree in the perplexingly regressive inquiries of
children, and more powerful evidences in the staunch pursuances of
science—we can hardly take thought to be sufficiently established to
give the right to the title of " thinking being," where we cannot suppose
this principle to be sufficiently established to assert its characteristic
function in the w»y of consecution.
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THE CONSTITUTION OP THOUGHT.. 491
On this view, customariness, whether in regard to co-ex-
istence or sequence, may be a ground of expectation, pos-
sibly intense expectation, without being a ground of rational
thought, simply because it can never suggest the task of
assigning the conditions of a phenomenon having, as against
its not having, a given objective—that is, prospective pre
aentative—significance.
Mere customariness rejected, will it seem strange, in view
of what has taken place in the history of philosophy, that we
should yet adduce a principle of causality, in a bare and
unambitious empirical sense, as the ground of the possibility
of the effective assigning of such significances ?
If Hume be right, if an empirical view of causality com-
passes nothing wider and more intensive than is embraced
in some customary succession in experience, we give up the
case.
We will go further, and say that if we had come upon the
antecedent upon which a phenomenon is, in the language of
John Stuart Mill, "invariably and unconditionally con-
sequent," l we should have found ourselves reduced by such
unconditionality to mere anticipation—had there been time
for it—without thinking : because there was nothing left to
think about. To attempt to give any reason for the succes-
sion as reduced to a perfectly unconditional succession is, by
the very terms of the case, an unwarrantable interpolation.
But Mill speaks not merely of an antecedent, but of a
""concurrence of antecedents," which introduces a very
•critical ambiguity. For if conjunctions in their immediate
freshness be, as they seem, the founts of causal change,3 we
may assign the fact of the concurrence as a condition of any
or each part of the group having causal relation to the
phenomenon; and so far, indeed, we can bring thought to
t>ear upon the case. But this is not bringing thought to
bear upon it so far as the sequence is regarded as uncondi-
tional—the concurrence itself being interpolated as a con-
dition.
Unconditional succession, if we could ever be sure we had
found it, is a matter for effective association, not directly for
thinking: and on the possibility of viewing causation as a
1
 Logic, bk. iii., oh. v., § 6.
•That any appreciably pre-constituted individual object or group
-should in it* isolation be the cause of an effect wising at any time is at
least inconceivable, whether that proves anything or not Were it the
nole constituent of the cause, it would seem that the effect must have
«xisted as long as it has existed, leaving us no means of establishing it
AS the cause.
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492 HUBERT FOSTON :
matter of conditional succession depends, I believe, the ex-
istence of thought about the world.
If, then, thought arises as the profitably sure assigning of
the conditions of some objective significance for a presenta-
tion, it is not the principle of causation either as one of mere
customary succession, or as one of unconditional succession,
that is involved in its establishing. A wakeful rational con-
fidence in a sure system of successions springs up rather
because, in cases where there does occur difference between
the issues of antecedent groups assumed to be like, we can
so constantly find, after all, an antecedent differentia1—and
this more and more as we are led to go about our inquiry
with persistence and nicety. We are led further and further
into the ranges behind ranges of such inquiry by the observa-
tion, not of mere constancies which would hardly BO much,
as dully confirm our expectations; but of more and more
subtle apparent inconstancies, which at first disappoint them,
but which prove clues to the discernment of a relative con-
stancy of determination on once unsuspected conditions.
And the inquiry, ever deepening, ever expanding, penetrating-
now with innumerable thread-like rootlets into the finest
interstices of a far-spreading area, sustains at last our vigor-
ous growth of confidence in the system of happenings as.
something which is more and more surely and profoundly to
be fl accounted for ". Thus there has arisen a general ex-
pectation, growing in weight, widening in consistent applica-
tion—not merely, as Hume seems to have fancied, that
events will continue to happen according to already observed
constancies—but that every inconstancy (as it appears to
pre-conception), will, when inquired into, yield us the know-
ledge of some more delicately contingent constancies.
The presence of the new different]© learnt can be assigned
(subject to correction, as we shall see in a moment) as the
condition of the. phenomenon as we at first knew it more
surely having the significance we supposed. .The absence of
them is thereby assigned as a contributory condition for &
negative significance. And should this negative significance
in turn be found inconstant, we may be able to observe the
intrusion of totally fresh differentiae—in the absence, however,
1
 Primitive instance* of each finding may occur through the uncertain
working of an instrument chosen or fashioned for a purpose—the parpoae-
gtimulaiing and defining the effort to remedy the uncertainty. Perhaps
even to-day the average man's sense of precise causality U sharper, the-
impulse to seek a differential ground of accidental variants keener, in
regard to machinery, than in regard to free objects in nature. Cf. follow-
ing section.
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THE CONSTITUTION OP THOUGHT. 493
of which the systematic thinker reflects doubt upon his whole
process: and he begins again with some other way of as-
signing the initial differentiae. Thus gradually drawing in
our circlings and hoverings more to its own lines, the " world "
—as we name the gradually evident system—becomes to us
more and more simply trustworthy. The directions of its
significances are assured to us through the assigning (under
persistent regulation by the pressure of the presentative order)
of conditions—through Thought.
The question of cause is here seen rising, as I suspect it
does rise, in the cleft between cases of succession which are
so far similar as to antecedents that similar expectations are
generated, but which diverge in their issues. If the perti-
nent question is disguised in the outwardly absolute and
discontinuous form, " What is the cause of this class of pheno-
mena? and of this? and of this?" its substance is more
truly expressed in the forms—ever modestly limited by the
contrasts of experience—" Why is it that A, so often followed
by B, is not now followed by i t ? " or "Why should A be
followed by B at other times rather than now f"1 For who
practically makes of the human intellect—scientific or other—
the extravagant demand that it should face the sheer stu-
pendous task of collecting the group of antecedents—widen-
ing out into a guard of essential favouring conditions lying
about us in every direction to the depth of a radius of a
whole universe for aught we can know—on which an event
will invariably and unconditionally follow? From day to
day, from century to century, our movement is to go on
defining the special phenomenal conditions of any class of
events just so far (we can reach no farther), and in such
ways, as the variations of our situations, accidental or pur-
posely induced, have enabled us to define them. And it were
hard if knowledge might not thus begin to be science, and
progressively deeper science^—though without the slightest
prospect that it should ever be entirely complete de profundis
in respect of one single instance of causation.
1
 Radium has attracted immense curiosity—through the hitherto cus-
tomary fulfilment of those relatively commonplace expectations with
which it startlingly conflicts. And is the attempt to formulate a reason
for the attendance of remarkable phenomena of radio-activity upon certain
presentations made outtide and beyond the measure of that contrast which
they and other objects mutually afford ?
2 * 3 3
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494 HUBERT FOSTON :
m.
PBACTICAL CONTROL OF CONDITIONAL SIGNIFICANCE.
It is not only in his highly developed artifice of language
that man shows the outward token or some critical psychical
difference between himself and the animals. Most impres-
sive, sorely, is that appearance, already alluded to, upon the
basis of the natural world, of an artificial world, which has
been established, and is maintained, through thought work-
ing in dependence upon the system of conditioning manifest
in the former. And I would suggest that the purpose and
work of gradually shaping an imaginatively given unpresented
feature in a rough piece of matter might well be important
in developing a tendency to abstract in the sense according
to which we have described abstraction. Such an exercise
seems just what is required for the initiation of mind into
the method required for thought—abstraction amidst all
the suggestions of comparatively definite and multitudinous
perception. It may be noted that, as against the perhaps
uot very intelligible process provided for by Nominalism, of
emphasising certain features in relation to a name somehow
attached to them, this is abstraction with a mediate intent,
so far as the quality is for some desired and anticipated
use.
Let it now be added, that without developed proneness to
intelligent reflexion upon what is being done in accordance
with tribal and traditional routine, the primitive artificer,
bent upon his continuously formative tasK, may yet let his
mind run over, the various possible uses of what he is thus
distinctively evolving—may fancy for his handiwork, as im-
aginatively completed, a variety of significances according to
conditioning circumstances, also mentally constructed. He
is thus unwittingly giving to his presentations and images a
function of essentially relatively determinable, or conditioned,
signification. Moreover, he may produce, not a weapon or
an instrument for immediate use, but the tool that shall
shape the tool—nay, the various forms of tool. This having
a determinable, but for the moment suspended or arrested,
significance with reference to what it shall help to produce,
and the mass of what it shall produce having a yet further
widely variable significance with reference to what the
different items of its content shall each variously do, there
is before him, if his mind would take advantage of it, the
suggestion of significance, the determination of which is
arrested for variously conditioned redirection from point to
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THE CONSTITUTION OF THOUGHT. 495
point through a series of terms. And as the system of pro-
duction expands, the time will come when the dull, quasi-
instinctive procedure, the constant, uninauiring following
of habit, with occasional meetings of special incidental oc-
currences with flashes of analytic insight, will serve no
longer. Man will be forced to think more constantly and
consecutively by the very progress of the works of his own
hands. The arrested significance which he is giving to the
forms he fashions only for the sake of other forms will at
last have to be distinctly apprehended—and language may
help him to apprehend it. He will have to give the deter-
minative bearing of one class of physical abstractions, if we
may so call them, that he has fashioned, upon other classes,
a distinct and controlled recognition in his mind. He must
deal with things more and more definitely as having a
mediate and conditional significance. So his creations be-
come the awakeners of his ideas to new power: that into
which he has put something of his own mind calls him to
think.
Thought is here supposed to be applied to objects and
their behaviour always under natural conditions, whatever
elements of manipulation may enter in. Such application
can hardly be supposed to proceed very far before being
accompanied by a similar application to processes under
natural conditions with no actual element of manipulation
entering in—though not, perhaps, without some gradually
Tefined consciousness resembling that which goes with mani-
pulation. And here the instrument of assertive speech,
immeasurably more subtle, penetrative, and comprehensive
in its operations than the fashioning hands, may begin to
hasten forward 1 distinctly to take the lead as the means of
the development of thought.
I am disposed to believe that man's more peculiar use of
language may be regarded as an extension of what he does
in making. A certain assertive2 element—foreign, I suppose,
to " animal language "—is an important psychical character-
istic of the utterance of a statement. And this I would trace
to the mastery of things as a maker being representatively
carried out to regions where such mastery is not at the
moment in operation, and may be impossible. Doing may
underlie saying: the actual arranging may lend substance
1 1 am not assuming that no unthinking sort of speech exists at all
before tools.
1 1 use the word with a tinge of its vigorous ordinary modern s«nse.
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496 HfBEBT FOSTON :
and animation to the ideal arranging of the Xoyo1;, the intelli-
gent speech.
IV.
DISGUISED IDEAL CONTBOL OF CONDITIONAL SIGNIFICANCE.
The general name, viewed out of relation to its possible
attributive or predicative contexts, may strikingly imply a de-
termination, in some yet widely indefinite direction perhaps,
of the idea of the significance of the objects of which it is a
name For it marks off a certain limit of considered capacity
in the object. But it is of special importance to observe that
it also involves an arrest of such determination—so far as it
leaves it to various possible, but now unformed, verbal con-
junctions to reflect possible determinations of the object's,
capacity into more and more definite channels. For example
the name " fluid " applied to an object only very indefinitely
suggests what the object may ultimately do for me, and mean
in my life : still less does it determine in what special manner
the object is to be expectedx at any time to realise some one
or other of those possible functions the ideas of which cluster
about the name " fluid ". These ideas of possible functions,
issues, significances, cluster about it in mutual suppression.
They make it a centre of suspended associative suggestion for
them all. They thus have shares, perhaps variously distant
and subtle, in constituting its raison d'etre, its ground of
8erviceableness; though every one of them, rising from the
midst of multitudinous latency as occasions severally hale
them forth from their conspiracy of mutual suppression, can
easily conceal its share—and thus give rise to what I consider
the inadequate view of the concept in which significances are-
forgotten. The significances, then, by help of association
with a name, are indeterminately held arrested in suspense
as more or less sub-consciously recognised possibilities. And
it wants now that other suggestive words, which likewise in
their isolation hold significances in suspense, should bring ir>
1
" Expectation," in my compressed and sufficiently burdened exposi-
tion, must be understood, by the reader's candour, to cover even such
expectations of the pott (to speak paradoxically, but not Hibernically), as-
an exponent of Geology may form as he carries on his thinking in the
newly and imaginatively re-created world of—ages ago. It covers simi-
larly ray sense of the once open possibilities of things as they were ten
years ago—both those since sealed a9 actualities on realised conditions,.
and those negatively sealed as possibilities in relation to now only im-
aginable conditions. . . . The breathless suspense in which we may trace
afresh the lines of some already familiar history is a psychological revela-
tion, I believe, of what is still true when less vividly evident
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THE CONSTITUTION OF THOUGHT. 497
their suggestive tendencies to the mutual determination of a
suggestion of some significance of which one can proceed to
avail oneself.
The conjoining of the foreign determinants, whenever it
is intended to arouse imaginative suggestions as expectations
actually meet to be entertained, however indefinitely and
remotely, about the objects named, is not purely attributive,
but predicative. Indeed, if a name alone is used with the
intent of awaking in expectant form some imaginative sug-
gestion attached to it, it is so far used predicatively.
Now it will often happen that the group of associations
of some name applied to an object lie nearer to a speaker's
purpose in referring to the object, than do the group of
associations attaching to some other name, by which, how-
ever, his hearer is more likely to have his attention readily
directed to the object itself. And this, in a rough way per-
haps, may indicate the type of occasion which calls for the
use of a proposition of two terms, connected by a copula,
or mentally connected in a way which may find expression
in a copula.1
Of the predicate I should say, as I say of all names in
accordance with the view of the essential nature of intel-
lection here implied throughout, that it is the mention of
an object, or of objects, which can only be effectively
mentioned in so far as they are capable of being determined,
more or less through human activity, to the realisation of
some kind of ulterior significance. Though an object be
mentioned, for instance, purely as calculated to affect my
aesthetic sensibilities, or solely as influencing my state of
mind in very far-off contemplation, I still think the very
reasonableness of its mention will depend on an assumption
that some actual development of a contingent significance
of its presentation—be that contingent significance only
1
 An important distinction seerus to develop between these " is "—
propositions and the " does "—propositions, with their active verb for
copula and predicate. The former point to the anticipated or considered
functions of objects indirectly, by means of a second name added to what
•we may call the remoter first term. The latter point more directly :
but their simpler efficiency, dependent as it is upon well-differentiated
nominal and verbal functions in language, appears to be something not
more primitive, but more advanced. Psychologically, it seems to
involve (1) a consciousness of one's own activity as what continues in
time, however briefly—as distinguished from mere arising new and
critical phases or features of being ; and (2) a sympathetic transference
of the idea of this to objects—not now considered hastily and narrowly
as some mere phase of them may affect UJ, but (in a wider intellectual
leisure) as if they were objects of interest " in themselves," to whose
now more continuously conceived actions we attended as their own.
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498 HUBEBT FOSTON :
whatever psychical result was to be anticipated from the
simple intenser devotion of my attention to it—is possi-
ble, and to be looked for. I esteem this as a principle of
so general a nature with reference to reaspname speech,
that it need not be left aside for any purpos^es—indeed, I
would challenge its neglect in formal logic, as a neglect
never countenanced by anything in nature or in mental
structure, though deeply chartered in tradition, and perhaps
in our own long-cherished views.1
If, now, in the proposition lately supposed, we mark the
predicate as P, and the subject as S, and suppose it uttered
in the form " All S's are P's," the condition of its truth and
trustworthiness, which is at the same time its import, lies
in this: that any objective * agent or determinant applied to
P's as such,3 may be applied to whatever we know as S's
to like effect—we may confidently treat S's just as we
treat P's. The work of prepositional statement is to unite
in respect of some identical range of ulterior significance
terms which were of variant suggestion for the mind—the
range of ulterior significance being that which is measured
by the predicate, and which we are now taught, perhaps .
unfamiliarly, to attach to what we were, however, used to
treating along lines suggested by the subject-term itself.
The assertion of an equivalence in respect of ulterior
significance is the force I ascribe to the copula. It does not
imply merely that the two groups of qualities marked by S
and P are to some extent the same: but rather that they
are one in respect of their significance as conditioned by any
determinant that is relevant to P.
The practical reference of our proposition might be near
or remote. Suppose it now to have been so near that P,
under the circumstances in which the proposition was
uttered, would leave the hearer in no doubt as to how he
was expected to adjust himself. But it is characteristic of
1
 The simple naturalness with which objects marked as " 8," or what
not, are forthwith, in Logic, assigned to, or made to constitute, the
logical fictionary class, seems to illustrate the tendency of the mind
further to determine them, at least imaginatively, in our objective sense
of doing something with them, or supposing something done with them.
The assigning of this class-significance to an object arises out of actual
sorting and moving—involving some actual and sensible determination
or change. Psychology, if I mistake not, has long gone astray in taking
this subtle relation to an indefinite class of similars as the significance of
a presentation as in thought.
•"Or subjectively originating." These words may be added to cover
the case of psychical issue through attention.
'I.e. to F s aa having the conditional significance suggested to the
interlocutors by the name P.
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THE CONSTITUTION OF THOUGHT. 4 9 9
thought that advances, to take a stand higher and higher
up the stream of conditionality—to seize on S's where the
contingency of their practical issue is richer, and the open
possibilities more numerous. If, then, we reserve the symbol
P just now to represent terms of proximate practical sug-
gestion, we may symbolise the new kind of statement attained
by ' S' is M '. It will be observed that if M can be P or P,,
the practical bearing of ' S' is M' is to that extent open and
uncommitted. But if the thinker advance to a statement
' 8" is Mj',1 from which, by way of ' M6 is M4,' ' M4 is M,,'
etc., a connexion with one P may be reached, from which
also, by way of ' M6 is M'4'2 and so on, a quite different
volition-directing P may be reached—still others by routes
of which ' M6 is M4 ' followed now by ' M4 is M',' * may be
a sufficient suggestion—the possible practical motives which
make it rational to say ' S" is M8" may be getting buried out
of sight for the speaker. But how when we begin to predi-
cate M'8 so remote from practical decisiveness that we may
fitly style them M»'s ? The Protean character of their prac-
tical relations forms a disguise so baffling, it appears, as to
have had the effect of invisibility itself.
To bring an utterance, then, to some obviously practical
issue might mean bringing its quota of influence forward
and still forward along any one of innumerable variously
ramifying possibilities of other, but connected, propositional
statement. The possibilities of practical issue attaching to
many valuable propositions may thus be left, by them, so
wide and undetermined, that it is little wonder if we have
fashioned our logics as though it were indifferent whether
a proposition ultimately had some possible practical refer-
ence or not. Yet if there could be a proposition with none,
I think it would stand outside any system of propositions
logically normal—a trifling example of intellectual vagary or
sport.
The disguise may be expected to be deep under those cir-
cumstances in which we keep'significance suspended, and
avoid unconstitutional references to foreign conditionings
of ulterior and subserved significances, on pain of expulsion
from the realm of Pure Mathematics.
1A fifth middle term away from a " P ". We omit the consideration,
in this quasi-diagrammatic treatment, that it might be the second or the
hundredth from another "P".
» M4 and M'4 mean that there may be two " fourth " middles between
an M, and a term of defined practical suggestion.
1
 Following oar first route for one stage, and then branching off on a
route differing both from that and from the second.
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500 HUBERT FOSTON :
All having to do, in thinking, with the conditioned activities
and sequences of objects is effectively veiled when, as in
Geometry, we assume everything to be still but the unnoted
finger or eye, the faintly imagined object or forgotten impal-
pability, which we are moving; while everything is passive
and unresistant but ourselves. Under this veiling, I suspect
that Euclid's directions and reflexions may fairly be read as
the study of a conditioning of voluntary movements to certain
effects. Take the first proposition. Confronted with a finite
straight line AB, recording an ever-retraceable movement
(how determined itself I will not now attempt to decide), the
object which I mean to move as directed is to be determined
to find its -way from one extremity A, safely back to the other
B, having pursued in its course two and only two rectilinear
directions, AC, CB, each for a distance equal to that between
the extremities. And first I learn how to condition its action
into movements from the extremities of the line, in any
direction whatever in the plane of the line, of equal length
with the line. (Or, constituting my circles by the revolu-
tion of the line itself, I may say of the same length.) Then
the movement is further and more definitely conditioned to
be along the course of movements already potentially made
in the fact of the presence of the revolving line in two
such positions that the situation, C, of its extremity A, in
the one case, was the same as that of its extremity B in the
other. A path can now be retraced, conditioning for the
complex object whose movement according to prescription is part
of its psychical constitution, the desired significance—a path
itself conditioned to condition the desired significance when-
ever actively retraced.
The assumed homogeneity of the conditions of movement,
as in pure space, rendering it possible to take a movement in
one portion of space as the potential making of it in any
other portion to which the line marked by the movement
may be considered to be transferred, excludes the differential
conditions on which thought depends, and apparently re-
duces the mental action to such an identification of equal
magnitudes in different situations as resembles the pure
generalisation of minds in which the pondering and question-
ing of thought has found no opening. This abandonment of
further thoughtful inquiry as hopeless, and consequent un-
questioning acceptance, is, I believe, somewhat oddly taken
for a " necessity of thought."l
1
 The question of the base of " necessity," from this point of view,
connects with the philosophical problem of the existence of a world in
which function as typical or general can be steadily effective.. This
opens up a profounder question in causation than any we have faced.
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THE CONSTITUTION OF THOUGHT. 501
I may just add that I would suggest that something like
the germ and spring of the inner development of the science
of Number appears when, accepting it as a rule that a certain
counted collection of objects is necessary to the accomplish-
ment of some purpose, and having a relatively incomplete
group, one considers what further counting out of objects
there must yet be to condition the whole group to the
desired significance or promise. On the present view of
thought I find nothing simpler in the way of thought, as
distinguished from instinctive behaviour, about numbers,
than the analysis of a given total in subtraction.
V.
PAST OBLIVION OF CONDITIONAL SIGNIFICANCE.
Reliance upon a systematic conditioning is essential to the
"vigorous growth of our interpretation of objective phases as
successive. This, accepted more and more steadily and dis-
cerningly as a sure, governing, though ever insensible prin-
ciple of our experience, makes for its deliverance from mere
•higgledy-piggledy phenomenalism.
How strange, then, to look back and 6ee near the begin-
ning of the history of European reflexion upon general
thought, a positive creation of rigid general substances that
should save knowledge from disintegration by their very
freedom from contingency I The creation seems to have
•arisen from a naive fixing of consideration upon severed
"words out of their vital use. And there is likely to be an
abiding difficulty in appreciating the nature of the possible
reference of a portion of machinery which we examine by
taking it out of its connexion with its highly variable gear.
Bo it would appear that Plato, moving without the direction
of a science long practised in systematic expression, and the
far-off but certain paving of ways to practical issues, started,
or confirmed, in his Realism, a diversion which Nominalism
in its misdirected denial still followed up, and which has
marked out the track of the psychological procedure of Ex-
perientialism even to our own day.
And if ancient philosophy, seizing, with Socrates, upon the
sure definability of a general name as affording security for
the fixed and reliable character of knowledge, but not there-
after proceeding to trace that definability to its roots in a
constant social intent in using names, based, again, in the
possibility of regulated expectations from objects, exhibits
an example of abortion in the development of the theory of
thought, modern philosophy may afford us another.
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502 HTJBEBT FO8TON :
The constituents of Locke's nominal essences are re-
cognised as being so selected from amongst the actual pro-
perties of things as to measure out certain species of things
—framing them in a conformity to nature sufficient to sub-
serve the purposes of social communication.1 The real
essence is the secret constitution conditioning the properties
of the species.8 So far, however, as these properties are-
only powers, which (while they make a great part of our
complex ideas of substance) * are not really in the substance
considered barely in itself, but " are nothing else but so many
relations to other substances," they plainly wait for the
substances of different sorts mutually " to operate " on each
other before they come to that manifestation and human
notice which alone can render their conditions the basis of
a nominal essence.4 This seems threatening to Locke's con-
finement of the real essence on which the nominal essence
depends * to being " that particular constitution which every-
thing has in itself, without any relation to anything without
i t " ; • since such a basis involves the concurrence of sub-
stances not of one sort, but of different sorts. He himself,
indeed, can refuse7 to consider substances " each of them as.
an entire thing by itself, having all its qualities in itself,""
and suggest for their powers a cosmic dependence, ranging
" not only beyond this our earth, and atmosphere, but even
beyond the Bun, or remotest star our eyes have yet dis-
covered ". "If some one of the stars or great bodies incom-
prehensibly remote from us, should cease to be or move as
it does," then, " perhaps, things in this our mansion, would
put on quite another face, and cease to be what they are."
But with what effect, we may ask, on nominal essences,,
and with what disclosure, upon the whole, of their true
conditions? "This," he says, "is certain, Things however
absolute and entire they seem in themselves, are but retainers,
to other parts of nature, for that which they are most taken
notice of by us." It would seem, then, that Locke comes
nearer than he is aware to finding the actual sustaining-
condition of the nominal essences not, indeed, in any con-
fined and rigid real essences of substances of particular sorts,,
but in the constant maintenance of order and system in the
immeasurable dependences of things.
As after Socrates, so after Locke, one could imagine the
1
 Bk. iiL, ch. vL, §§ 89, 30, 36.
'BkiiL, ch. vL, §6. »Bk. ii., oh. xxiiL, g a
'Of. bk ii., ch. xxiii., § 87, end; also ef. bk. ii., ch. xxxi, 8 8 end.
•BLi i i , ch. vL, S 2. «Bk. iii, ch. vL, § a
TBk.iv.,ch. v i , § l l .
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THE CONSTITUTION OF THOUGHT. 5 0 3
direct sequel in philosophy changed. Instead of that in-
sufficiently pragmatistic examination of the abstract idea
(Locke's nominal essence) whereby Berkeley led the way for
Hume, we might fancy an immediate reaching of that de-
velopment towards which Locke seems thus to have been
unconsciously borne.
Locke and Hegel unite in telling us—what our thought
continually implies as it follows, in deepening assurance, an
objective directing the ultimate Bpring and security of which
is out of sight—that things are not essentially their bare
individual selves. We can think of each only as having a
significance which belongs apart to none, and belongs to
any only on conditions which we ever more fully, but ever
incompletely, assign.
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